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THE STANDARD FOR ADMITTING SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: A CRITIQUE FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF JUROR
PSYCHOLOGY*
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIEDt

a wide margin, the Wayne Williams prosecution in Atlanta is
the most highly publicized case in recent memory. One reason
for the publicity was the incredibly long chain of homicides that led
to the trial. Undoubtedly, another factor was that the homicides generated an unprecedented atmosphere of fear in a major city.' At least
one commentator, however, has singled out another reason, namely
that the Williams case "highlight[ed] a major development in the...
courtroom. With the help of . . . [scientific] advances, more and
more silent [physical] evidence is being turned into loudly damning
BY

testimony. "2

The Wilh'ams prosecution is by no means an isolated case. In
1980, the National Center for State Courts released the results of a
nation-wide survey of trial judges and attorneys. 3 The Center found
that almost half the judges and attorneys surveyed encounter scientific evidence in approximately one-third of their trials. 4 One prosecutor even stated that scientific evidence is now "the backbone of
every circumstantial evidence case." '5 The trend is unmistakably to* This article is based in part on the Twelfth Hodson Criminal Law Lecture
that the author delivered at the Judge Advocate General's School, University of
Virginia, on March 18, 1983.
t Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. B.A., 1967;
J.D., 1969, University of San Francisco.
1. See generall Williams: Guilty as Charged, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1982, at 31; Wi/iams: 'PriorBad Acts'?, NEWSWEEK Jan. 25, 1982, at 39; Wilhams in the Dock, NEWSWEEK Jan. 18, 1982, at 39; A "Shark" Goes Afler the Evidence, TIME, Jan. 18, 1982, at
25; The Trial of Wayne Williams, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 28, 1981, at 40; The Atlanta Case:
Murder Times Two, NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1981, at 28; Atlanta: Profile of a Suspect,
NEWSWEEK, July 6, 1981, at 22; Case of the Green Carpet, TIME, July 6, 1981, at 12;
Atlanta Takes a Suspect, NEWSWEEK June 29, 1981, at 38; Atlanta: A Break That Never
Came, NEWSWEEK, June 15, 1981, at 35; City ofFear, TIME, Mar. 2, 1981, at 31.
2. This is the view of Bennett Beach, legal editor of TIME. See Mr. W1zard Comes
to Court, TIME, Mar. 1, 1982, at 90.
3. Study To Investigate Use OfScienqfic Evidence, 7 NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE CTS.
REP. 1 (Aug. 1980).
4. Id.
5. Clark, Scientift Evidence, in THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK 542 (P. Healy &
J. Manak eds. 1969). See also Thornton, Uses andAbuses of ForensirScience, 69 A.B.A. J.
288 (1983).

(554)
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ward increased use of scientific evidence at trial.
The temptation is to applaud the trend and welcome increased
reliance on scientific evidence. But before joining the cult of science,
we should pause to consider some recent incidents. In 1980, Food and
Drug Administration officials charged that of the 12,000 clinical researchers in the United States, "perhaps as many as ten percent do
something less than [honest research]." '6 In 1981, outright fraud was
7
discovered in one of the leading cancer research programs at Cornell.
Earlier this year, one health journal estimated that fifteen percent of
all medical laboratory tests are in error.8 Unfortunately, these
problems are not confined to the laboratory; they are spilling over
into the courtroom. For instance, in 1982 an experienced trial attorney charged that forensic experts are misstating and overstating their
credentials in "a lot of cases" and that the problem is "growing." 9 In
short, there is good reason to be cautious before placing an inprimatur
on the trend toward increased use of forensic evidence; and since
many courts are rethinking the standard for the admission of scientific evidence, 10 this is an opportune time to review the causes, criticisms and merits of the trend.
THE CAUSES OF THE INCREASED USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

What are the causes of this phenomenon? One factor is the pace
of technological change, which constantly increases the number of scientific instruments and techniques available for use in the courtroom.
As the Utah Supreme Court suggested in 1980, this is "an age when
one scientific advancement tumbles in rapid succession upon another
.
This increase in the number of scientific techniques is understandable for it has been estimated that ninety percent of all the
scientists who have ever lived are alive today. 12 The phenomenon,
however, reflects not only this increase in the number of scientists and
6. W.

BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 83 (1983).
7. Id. at 63-73.
8. Bechtel, Medical Tests: Don't Bet Your Life On Them, PREVENTION, Jan. 1983,
at 55. The author estimated that the 15% error rate accounts for approximately four
million erroneous test results daily. Id.
9. Granelli, MedicalExperts: The Pitfalls, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 24, col. 2.
See People v. Cornille, 33 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2144 (Ill.
Sup. Ct. April 13, 1983).
In addition to the problem of experts overstating their credentials, it is not uncommon for experts to overstate the conclusions that can be drawn from various scientific
techniques. Giannelli, The Admissbilith of Novel Scientift Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1238 (1980).
10. For a discussion of recent approaches used in developing a standard for admitting scientific evidence, see notes 25-38 and accompanying text in7fra.
11. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Utah 1980).
12. W. BROAD & N. WADE, supra note 6, at 53.
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techniques, but also the fact that scientists are more focused on the
forensic application of their research than ever before. Perhaps the
most significant accomplishment of the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) is that it heightened scientists' consciousness
of the contribution that they can make to the criminal justice
system. 13
Conceivably, these factors could explain the increased use of scientific evidence, but to rely solely on them would overlook important
developments outside the scientific community. A major cause for
the increased use of scientific evidence is simply that the. evidentiary
barriers to the admission of scientific proof are falling. Dean McCormick once predicted that "[t]he manifest destiny of evidence law is a
progressive lowering of the barriers to truth."' 4 The law of scientific
evidence seems to be bearing out that predictibn. 15
Until recently, in most jurisdictions the courts singled out scientific evidence and forced it to surmount a special, extraordinary standard to gain admission.' 6 That standard was the test announced in
Frye v. United States.I7 Under Frye, it is not enough that one qualified
expert vouches for the theory and instrument; as part of the foundation for the admission of the scientific evidence, the expert must also
testify that the theory and instrument have gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific circle.1 8 Frye was not only the majority view among American courts; it was the almost universal view,
13. The LEAA was created under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (1976). The LEAA sponsored research
projects encouraging the use of scientific knowledge for forensic purposes. See generally Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1199.
14. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 165 (1954).
15. For a discussion of the relaxed standards which some courts have applied in
admitting scientific evidence, see notes 25-38 and accompanying text infra. See also
Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1237, 1245-46; Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of
Scientific Evidence: A Primer on Evaluating The Weight of Sciintifr Evidence, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 261 (1981); Note, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 875, 880-85 (1979).
16. See Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1204. See also Note, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 759
(1979).

17. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18. Id. at 1014. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Frye court found
that the lie-detector test had not gained sufficient standing and scientific recognition
to justify the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the results of such a test. Id.
In much quoted language, the Frye court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable states is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientift principle or discovery, the thingfrom which the deduction is made must be sufftizently estabhhed to have gained general acceptance in the
parti ular fteld in which itbelongs.

Id. (emphasis added).
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with the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts following
1
it.
9 Indeed, at one point in the mid-1970's, Fye seemed to be the
20
controlling test in at least forty-five states.
Frye is a formidable barrier to the introduction of scientific evidence as a quick review of some of the leading cases decided in 1977
illustrates. In that year alone, appellate courts citing Frye excluded
evidence derived from the Decatur Ra-Gun, 2 1 ion microprobic analysis 2 2 and a trace metal detection technique. 23 The impact of Frye is
clear. Even if the world's leading scientific authority on a subject attests toa new theory, even if the Nobel prize winner in a specific field
conducts a thorough, well-designed experiment to validate the technique, the courts cannot admit the evidence until most of the scien24
tists in that specialized field know and approve of the theory.
In many jurisdictions, however, courts are abandoning Frye and
relaxing the standards for the admission of scientific evidence.2 5 In a
number of states, the courts have reached this result by exercising
their judicial power to change common-law rules. The courts of Flor19. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir. 1975)
("[b]ecause the polygraph has yet to gain general judicial recognition, the proponent
of such evidence has the burden of laying a proper foundation showing the underlying scientific basis and reliability of the expert's testimony."); United States v. Bruno,
333 F. Supp. 570, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (ink identification not yet sufficiently advanced
to be admissible as evidence); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377
(1978) (testimony based on "voiceprints" inadmissible as evidence of voice identification, since "voiceprints" had not reached the standard of acceptance in the scientific
and legal communities required by Fye); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97,
110, 436 A.2d 170, 177 (1981) (process of refreshing recollection by hypnosis has not
gained sufficient acceptance to permit introduction of hypnotically-refreshed testimony). But see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
dented, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979) (to determine the admissibility of voiceprint analysis, the
court must balance the materiality and reliability of the evidence against its tendency
to mislead, confuse or prejudice the jury); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 505 (Me.
1978) (voiceprint analysis is sufficiently reliable to be relevant and admissible).
20. Note, supra note 16, at 769.
21. State v. Boyington, 153 N.J. Super. 252, 379 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977). The Decatur Ra-Gun is an instrument which uses the Doppler radar
effect to detect violation of the speed limit. Id. at 254, 379 A.2d at 487.
22. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977). The Brown court
defined ion microprobic analysis as "a technique for measuring the trace element of a.
sample matrix." Id. at 555. Each matrix tested is compared to the others tested to
see if they had a common origin (e.g. victim's hair and hair found on the defendant's
clothing). Id.
23. People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The
"trace-metal detection test" determines whether an individual has recently held a
metal object by applying a chemical solution and observing the affected area under
an ultraviolet light. Id. at 711, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
24. See Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientifi Evi
dence, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 33, 43 (2d ed. 1981).
25. For a general discussion on the relaxation of the Fgye standard, see Imwinkelried, supra note 15, at 264-67.
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ida, 26 Georgia, 27 Iowa, 28 Kentucky, 29 Michigan,3 0 New York, 3 1 Oregon, 3 2 and Utah 33 all have done so. Other jurisdictions have lowered
the admission standards through statutory construction. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit 34 and the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois3 5 have construed the Federal Rules of
Evidence as impliedly overturning Fre. In addition, courts in Maine,
Montana, New Mexico and Ohio, which have adopted evidence
codes patterned after the Federal Rules, have found that Frye is no
longer good law. 36 In California, the passage of Proposition Eight,
26. Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dmzssed,
234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) (trial judge has wide
discretion in admitting evidence and his decision concerning the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion).
27. Harper v.State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982) (proper test for determining admissibility of a scientific procedure is not whether technique has gained
acceptance in scientific community but whether procedure has reached a scientific
stage of verifiable certainty).
28. State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981)
(reliability and inherent understandability sufficient basis for admission of bloodstain
and blood splatter analysis).
29. Brown v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1982) (blood-test results admissible even though not widely used since they were supported by a qualified expert
witness).
30. People v. Young, 106 Mich. App. 323, 308 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1981)
(jury permitted to hear expert testimony on electrophoresis blood analysis since a
qualified expert vouched for electrophoresis).
31. People v. Daniels, 102 Misc. 2d 540, 545-46, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832, 837 (Sup. Ct.
1979) (test for admissibility of polygraph evidence should be merely whether there is
probative value, since to require general acceptance would mandate absolute
infallibility).
32. State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981), ajfd, 292 Or. 350,
638 P.2d 1145 (1982) (only foundation required for the admission of a scientific technique which is not generally accepted is credible evidence sufficient for the trial judge
to make the initial determination that the technique is reasonably reliable).
33. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1236-38 (Utah 1980) (applying a "reasonable reliability" test to human leucocyte antigen test in a paternity action).
34. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979). By applying Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Wi!liams court determined that "spectrograph voice analysis evidence [was] not so inherently unreliable or misleading as to require its exclusion from the jury's consideration
in every case." Id. at 1200. Rule 702 provides that "if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FEn. R. EVID. 702. See also, Note, supra note 15.
1981).
35. See United States v. Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. 1118, 1134 n.14 (N.D. Ill.
The Dorfman court's view of the relation between Frye and the Federal Rules of Evidence was somewhat ambiguous. In emphasizing that it did not adhere to Frye, it
is unclear whether the Federal Rules of Evidence follow the Frye rule,
noted that "[ilt
although some leading commentators feel the rules have repudiated Frye." Id. (citations omitted).
36. See Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., 657 P.2d 594 (Mont. 1983): State v.
Williams, 33 CRIM. L. RE!'. (BNA) 2051 (Ohio Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 1983); State v.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 2

1982-83]

ADMITTING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

the so-called Victim's Bill of Rights, may have the same effect. 37 Finally, in two states, courts have allowed defendants to avoid Frye on
the basis of a constitutional right to present critical evidence. 38 The
upshot is that in two federal circuits and thirteen states, the precedential value of Frye is either nonexistent or suspect. The liberalization of
the admission standards for scientific evidence will encourage attorneys to offer the more novel types of scientific evidence that our technology is developing. This, in turn, should further increase the use of
scientific evidence by the courts.
The final cause of the increasing use of scientific evidence may be
the most important catalyst. Specifically, attorneys have come to the
realization that lay jurors expect scientific proof. The evidence of this
expectation is largely anecdotal:
A prosecutor from the East Coast thought that he had a
strong case. He was a bit surprised that the defendant had
not pleaded guilty. At trial, the defendant was a rather
poor witness. The verdict-an acquittal--came as a shock.
After the verdict, the prosecutor asked some of the jurors
why the jury had balked at convicting. One juror explained
that the prosecutor had not presented any fingerprint evidence. During the trial, no one, including the defense counsel, had even mentioned the word "fingerprint." However,
after years of watching the television programs, the FBI.,
HawaiiFive-O, and Quincy, the jurors had built up an expectation that the prosecution would offer scientific proof of
guilt. When he failed to do so, the jury found reasonable
39
doubt.
Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978) (admission of scientific evidence requires only a
showing that the evidence is relevant and of assistance to the trier of fact); State v.
Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App.), affd, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204
(1975) (polygraph evidence admissible under governing evidentiary rules). See also
Romero, The Admi stbi''y of Scientift Evidence Under the New Mexico and FederalRules of
Evidence, 6 N.M. L. REv. 187 (1976); Note, supra note 16.
37. See Uelmen, Proposit'ion8 Casts Uncertainty over Vast Areas of CriminalLaw, CAL.
LAW., July/Aug. 1982, at 45. The author notes that "[b]y requiring the admission of
all relevant evidence, the initiative abrogates all California decisions applying the
Fye test." Id. (citations omitted).
38. See State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1975), aft'd, 88
N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975) (polygraph results admissible under due process analysis when defendant's credibility is a crucial issue); State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31,
369 N.E.2d 24 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1977) (due process entitles defendant to new
trial during which he may undergo a polygraph examination, the results of which
can be disclosed to the jury). See also Imwinkelried, Chambers v. Mssissippit The Constitutional Right to Present Defense Evidence, 62 MIL. L. REV. 225 (1973).
39. See Imwinkelried, supra note 24, at 36-37.
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The moral of this story has not been lost by experienced trial attorneys. A well-known speaker and author on trial advocacy has stated
that in any case in which the jury might expect fingerprint evidence
but in which the evidence is lacking, his practice is to call a fingerprint technician as a witness to explain to the jury why the evidence is
missing. 40 This advice takes on even more significance today in light
of the publicity given trials such as the Wih'ams prosecution. The
media gave that case maximum publicity, and scientific evidence in
the form of fiber and hair analysis played a pivotal role. 41 The inevitable result of the Williams case and others like it is that the jurors'
expectation of scientific proof is probably stronger now than at any
point in our prior history. In short, there is legally and technologically more opportunity to use scientific evidence than in the past and
more incentive to capitalize on that opportunity.
THE CRITICISMS OF THE INCREASED USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

Our society is so enamored with science that it is easy to assume
that the increased use of scientific evidence is not only inevitable but
also necessarily beneficial. A moment's reflection, however, shows
that these assumptions are false. The expanded use of scientific evidence is not unavoidable; we could maintain Fgre or even toughen the
standard for admitting scientific evidence. Nor is the increased use of
such evidence necessarily beneficial. Quite apart from the problem of
scientific fraud, scientists, judges, and jurors all are fallible. If the
incidence of error in scientific analysis is too high, or if the trier of fact
is unable to evaluate the evidence critically, the increased use of scientific evidence may be undesirable. Indeed, the critics of scientific evidence raise precisely these two points: the mounting evidence of
misanalysis in forensic science 4 2 and doubts whether triers of fact, es43
pecially lay jurors, can cope with forensic evidence.
These two criticisms of scientific evidence have substantial merit.
There is, for instance, evidence of a shockingly high level of error in
forensic analysis. In the late 1950's, the Toxicology Section of the
American Academy of Forensic Sciences uncovered indications of "a
40. This comment was made by Mr. E. J. Salcines, state attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, during a lecture he delivered in New York a few
years ago. See generally E. SALCINES, TRIAL TECHNIQUE-PREDICATE QUESTIONS
(Nat'l Dist. Att'y Ass'n 1977).
41. For a listing of just a few of the articles discussing this trial, see note 1 supra.
42. For a discussion of this forensic misanalysis, see notes 44-56 and accompanying text tnfra. See also Imwinkelried, supra note 15, at 267-69.
43. For a discussion of the judicial concern that jurors may be excessively influenced by scientific evidence, see notes 57-67 and accompanying text ithfa. See also
Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1237.
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great degree of error" in blood alcohol analyses. 44 In the mid-1970's,
Dinovo and Gottschalk reported significant variations among labora45
tories in drug analysis.
These blood alcohol and drug studies were conducted on a small
scale, but they inspired the much larger and systematic Laboratory
Proficiency Research Testing Program which was conducted by the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. 46 Two hundred and
forty forensic laboratories throughout the United States participated
in this testing program. The Project Advisory Committee sent the
participating laboratories blind samples for analysis. 47 An alarmingly
high percentage of the laboratories submitted inaccurate or incomplete responses. 48 For example, on three of the twenty-one tests, fewer
49
than half the laboratories arrived at a correct, complete analysis.
The LEAA project director, Mr. John Sullivan, conceded that the
program demonstrated that laboratories were having difficulty in
50
identifying the samples.
In January 1983, the Journal of Forensic Sciences published the results of a new survey on the proficiency of toxicology laboratories 5' in
52
which 105 laboratories, representing forty-nine states, participated.
The results of this survey are consistent with the findings of the Laboratory Proficiency Testing program. The 1983 survey tested and
found error in the participating laboratories' qualitative and quantitative analyses. As to the laboratories' qualitative analyses, the survey
revealed a significant percentage of false positive and negative results;
analysts reported finding chemicals that were not present and also
failed to identify chemicals that were present. 53 The survey team described the laboratories' performance on these samples as "disap44. See Niyogi, Toxicology, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 343, 383 (2d
ed. 1981).
45. Dinovo & Gottschalk, Results of a Nine-Laboratoy Survey of Forensic Toxicology
Proficiency, 22 CLIN. CHEM. 843 (1976). This study analyzed a testing program
designed to "assist the National Institute on Drug Abuse in its efforts to improve the

investigating and reporting of drug related deaths in nine major U.S. cities . ... "
Id. The study's major finding was that the nine laboratories examined "varied considerably in the precision and accuracy with which they performed drug assays." Id.
at 846.
46. PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE,

LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING

PROGRAM (1975-76).

47. LEAA NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1978, at 1, col. 1, at 5, col. 1.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Peat, Finnigan & Finkle, Proficiency Testing in Forensc Toxicology. A Feasibility
Study, 28 J. FORENSIC SCI. 139 (1983).

52. Id. at 141.
53. Id. at 144.
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pointing." 54 The survey also discovered errors in quantitative
analyses, finding "considerable" interlaboratory variation in quantitation. 55 On some samples, the coefficient of variation was 133%.56
In the minds of many, if not most, courts, the first criticism is
compounded because lay jurors are in awe of scientific testimony and
tend to overestimate its probative value. If this is true, Frye makes
eminently good sense; Frye helps to ensure that the only scientific evidence admitted is that which measures up to the jurors' exaggerated
expectations.
Judicial concern for these exaggerated expectations is most prevalent in the area of statistical proof. 57 In the leading case of People v.
Co/ins, 58 the California Supreme Court characterized mathematics as
54. Id. at 139.
55. Id. at 157.
56. Id. at 156.
57. Statistical proof is the presentation of mathematical probabilities of the happening of certain events. All evidence involves the question of probabilities. See FED.
R. Eviin. 401. This rule states that " '[rielevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action moreprobable or lessprobable than it would be without the evidence."
Id. (emphasis added).
A common example of the use of probabilities is fingerprint testimony in which
an expert assesses the probability that several sets of prints were produced by the
same person's hand. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 414 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
While questions of probabilities are quite common, the use of mathematics experts to
present statistical evidence has been rare. See Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Idenqication Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REv. 489, 489 n.2 (1970) (citing seven
cases). For a discussion of the use of statistics and probabilities in trials, see Kaplan,
DeciRiion Theory and the Faco/inding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1968).
58. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). In Collins, a professor
of mathematics testified that the probability of more than one set of persons having
the characteristics of the perpetrators of the crime, as elicited from eyewitnesses, was
one in twelve million. Id. at 325-26, 438 P.2d at 36-37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501. The
court concluded that this evidence should not have been admitted on the ground,
tler aha, that probability theory could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
1) the guilty couple in fact possessed the characteristics described by witnesses, and
2) only one couple possessing the characteristics could be found within the area. Id.
at 330, 438 P.2d at 40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05. Since the case was close, the admission of this evidence was prejudicial and warranted a new trial. Id. at 332, 438 P.2d
at 41-42, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
For other cases involving the use of mathematical probability theory, see Miller
v. State, 240 Ark. 340, 343-44, 399 S.W.2d 268, 270 (1966) (statistical evidence inadmissible since based on estimates and assumptions); People v. Jordan, 45 Cal. 2d 697,
707, 290 P.2d 484, 490 (1955) (expert's conclusions about certain probabilities were
properly admitted since an adequate factual groundwork had been laid); State v.
Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 354, 414 P.2d 858, 862 (1966) (probability theory applied to
identity of the criminal inadmissible where odds are based on estimates of unproven
validity); People v. Risely, 214 N.Y. 75, 84-85, 108 N.E. 200, 202-03 (1915) (evidence
of probabilities that a forged document was typed on defendant's typewriter inadmissible where witness failed to qualify as an expert in the mechanics of typewriters).
For the earliest reference to the use of probability theory, see The Hlowland Will Case, 4
AM. L. REv. 625, 648-49 (1870) (discussing Robinson v. Mandell, 20 F. Cas. 1027
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"a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society," a sorcerer who
threatens to "cast a spell" over the trier of fact. 59 While courts have
aimed their most pointed comments at statistical evidence, they have
also voiced a general doubt as to whether lay jurors can properly assess any scientific evidence. The same California court that decided
Colns expressed concern about the "misleading aura of certainty
which often envelops a new scientific process .... "60 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals has asserted that jurors often attribute a
"mystic infallibility" to scientific testimony. 6' In a similar vein, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has stated that jurors routinely overesti62
mate the objectivity and certainty of scientific evidence.
The judicial skepticism of jurors' ability to evaluate the evidence
is deep-seated, 63 with courts often relying on that skepticism as a rationale for the Fgye test. 64 Moreover, in recent years, courts have
taken their skepticism one step further-a step that may yet have
great impact on the use of scientific evidence in civil cases. In a growing line of cases, dealing with complex, technical issues, some federal
courts have invoked their doubts about juror competence as a basis
for overriding the seventh amendment right to a jury trial. 65 In these
(C.C.D. Mass. 1868) (No. 111959)) (use of probability theory in handwriting
analysis).
59. 68 Cal. 2d at 320, 438 P.2d at 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
60. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 32, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 129 Cal. Rptr. 144,
149 (1976) (quoting Huntington v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 656, 414 P.2d 382, 390,
51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1966)).
61. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also
United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. dented, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975)
(relevant scientific evidence should not be excluded unless "an exaggerated popular
opinion of its accuracy" is likely to prejudice the jury).
62. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (1978).
63. To emphasize the limitations of the lay citizens who serve as jurors, one
court contrasted the technological success of the space program to the human failings
dramatized in Watergate. D'Arc v. D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. 553, 565, 385 A.2d 278,
284 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978), af'd, 175 N.J. Super. 598, 421 A.2d 602 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). More specifically, in refusing to admit voiceprint evidence, the court emphasized that this evidence could assume an "aura of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen." Id. (citations omitted). It noted in
conclusion:
Admittedly, the burden borne by the proponents of a new scientific
technique is a heavy one. But in an era permeated with man's disbelief in
man, perhaps rooted in Watergate, and in which mankind has taken for
granted the infallibility of science, somewhat rooted in the successes of
space exploration, we should expect nothing less.
Id.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v.
Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); People v. King, 266
Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364
(1978).
65. See Higginbotham, Contthutng the Dialogue." CivilJurts and the Allocation ofJudi-
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civil cases, the lower federal courts have held that the case's technical
complexity warranted denying a party the right to a jury trial, a right
66
the party otherwise would have had under the seventh amendment.
In one case, the court declared that the sophisticated scientific testimony "may exceed the ability of a [lay] jury to decide the facts in an
'67
informed and capable manner.
The combined effect of these criticisms-the level of error in forensic analysis and the jury's supposed inability to critically evaluate
the evidence-is a powerful argument for caution in the admission of
scientific proof. If these criticisms are well-founded, the result of liberally admitting scientific evidence may be a miscarriage of justice
rather than increased reliability in fact-finding.
THE COUNTERARGUMENTS TO THE CRITICISMS

Even the most ardent proponent of the expanded use of scientific
evidence would acknowledge that there is a large element of truth in
these criticisms. It seems patent that there is a significant level of
error in forensic analysis--certainly a higher level than we initially
suspected. Furthermore, common sense suggests that lay jurors with
little or no background in science will have difficulty understanding
complex, technical testimony.
In the final analysis, however, the criticisms of scientific evidence
miss the point. It is misleading to focus solely on the strengths and
weaknesses of scientific evidence. In principle, the judgment must be
comparative. To the extent that we discriminate against scientific evidence, subjecting it to uniquely discriminatory, restrictive rules such
as Frye, we encourage the courts to rely on other types of evidence.
Thus, our task is not to make an absolute judgment about the merits
of scientific evidence. Rather, our task is to compare it with other
types of evidence to decide whether the differential treatment of scientific evidence is justifiable. In the end, this comparison leads to the
conclusion that the judicial discrimination against scientific evidence
is unsound.
cialPower, 56 TEX. L. REv. 47, 53-55 (1979); Note, The Right to Jury Trials in Complex
Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898 (1979). See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R. FEi. 733
(1981). This line of cases reflects the concern for juror competence expressed by the
Supreme Court. See Ross v. Bernhard, 369 U.S. 531 (1970). In attempting to define
the limitations on the right to jury trial in civil cases, the Court referred to "the
practical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. at 538 n. 10. Published cases raising
this point generally involve either complicated antitrust or securities litigation, requiring extensive, complex expert testimony. See, e.g., Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950
(4th Cir. 1977), aft'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
66. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
67. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
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Consider, for example, the criticism that there is a significant incidence of error in forensic analysis. Before leaping to the conclusion
that the level of error justifies Fye, we must compare that level of
error with the incidence of error in other types of potential evidence,
such as lay eyewitness testimony. Even a cursory review of the witness psychology studies of eyewitness identification 68 will demonstrate
that the error in eyewitness testimony is at least as frequent and less
controllable than error in scientific testimony.
Indeed, to say that lay testimony is as error prone as scientific
evidence is an understatement. Although it is true that the margin of
error was substantial on some of the tests in the Laboratory Proficiency Testing Research Program, 69 the margin was negligible on
other tests. For example, on tests of drugs and fibers, the accuracy
level was nearly ninety-nine percent.7 0 Contrast that with the witness
psychology studies of lay eyewitness identification testimony 7 l where
researchers consistently find a high level of error. 72 There are literally
hundreds of studies confirming this finding. 73 In one experiment,
fewer than fifteen percent of the lay witnesses to a simulated crime
correctly identified the perpetrator.74 If we consider other types of
routinely admitted lay testimony such as excited utterances, the available data indicates not only a possibility, but worse yet, a high
75
probability of inaccuracies.
The level of error in lay testimony is not only high; unfortunately, the error is largely intractable. Inherent deficiencies in the
68. For references to studies of eyewitness testimony, see note 71 tfra.
69. For a discussion of these tests, see notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
70. PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 251.
71. See E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Buckout & Greenwald, Witness Psychology, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 1291 (2d ed. 1981); Buckout,
Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sci. AM. 23 (1974); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal
Identifcation: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973); Stewart,
Perception, Memoy and Hearsay, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1.
72. For an interesting discussion of the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, see
Buckout, supra note 71. Dr. Buckout has conducted numerous tests on the unreliability of eyewitnesses. In one experiment, an assault on a college professor was staged
before 141 eyewitnesses. Id. at 29. Four weeks later, the witnesses were shown a
photo-spread which included the "attacker." Only 40% identified the "attacker"
when they were asked, "Do you recognize any of these men?" However, when shown
a distinctive picture and told that "[o]ne of these men is the suspect; it is important
that you identify him," 60% identified the man. Id. at 29-30.
73. For good bibliographies of the available literature in this area, see E. LOFTUS, supra note 71, at 237-47; A. YARMEY, supra note 71, at 230-67.
74. Buckout & Greenwald, supra note 71, at 1298.
75. See Stewart, supra note 71, at 28.
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human processes of perception and memory cause the error,7"; and
..very little can be done to improve" the processes. 77 Furthermore,
nothing can be done to control the fortuitous events, such as traffic
accidents and crimes, that lay persons unexpectedly witness.
In contrast, the laboratory is a much more controllable environment. Laboratories have tools such as microscopes for enhancing
powers of perception."' Scientists can use photographic techniques to
record events and thereby eliminate concerns about the quality of
memory.7 9 Experiments can be planned to allow time for meticulous
observation and recordation. Thus, notwithstanding the evidence of
error in scientific analysis, we should not discriminate against such
testimony on this basis. Lay testimony is even more prone to error,
and the causes of errors in it are less cohtrollable than the sources of
inaccuracy in scientific analysis. When we examine the comparative
data on lay and scientific testimony, scientific evidence fares very
well.
Even if scientific evidence is less error prone than other types of
evidence, discrimination against scientific evidence would be defensible ifjurors attach too much weight to it. This, the second criticism
of scientific evidence,8 0 is precisely what the advocates of the Frye test
repeatedly assert. 8' Numerous courts, including the California
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
82
and the Maryland Court of Appeals, have expressed this concern.
But, is this assertion merely speculation, or is there empirical support
for it? The truth is that there is little or no objective support for the
assertion and that almost all the available data points to the contrary
conclusion.
The starting point for any discussion of the competence of lay
jurors must be the Chicago Jury Project.8 3 This project is unques76. See Levine & Tapp, supra note 71, at 1095-1103. See also H. BuRivr, APPI.IED
PsYcFtoI.cx;Y 292-301 (1941).
77. Levine & Tapp, supra note 71, at 1130.
78. See Judd, Scanning Elctron Microscopy as Apphed to Forensic Evidence Analysis, in
ScIFNTIFrC AN) EXPERT EVIDENCE 873 (2d ed. 1981).
79. See A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAl. CASES
507-63 (2d ed. 1978).
80. For a discussion of this second criticism, see notes 57-67 and accompanying
text supra.

81. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra. See also Note, supra note 15.
82. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
83. H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEi., THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). This study, conducted by the University of Chicago Law School and funded by the Ford Foundation, examined the dynamics ofjuries in criminal trials by submitting questionnaires
to 3500 judges of which 555 "Ic]ooperated fully." Id. at 33-44. The judges were
asked to answer specific questions about the actual cases before them, particularly
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tionably the most intense study ever conducted on the ability and
behavior of American jurors. It led to the publication of the
84
landmark work, The AmerzcanJuy by Professors Kalven and Zeisel,
which discusses the question of whether juries can adequately follow
the evidence and understand the case.8 5 This study reaches two important conclusions. First, the authors conclude that "the jury does
by and large understand the facts and get the case straight. '8 6 The
authors state this conclusion quite forcefully; in their view, the available data is "a stunning refutation of the hypothesis that the jury does
not understand" the facts. 87 The authors also concluded that the
jury's verdict "moves with the weight and direction of the evidence." 88 Again, the authors were of the opinion that the results permitted a fairly definite conclusion. After charting the data, the
authors state that the available studies "corroborate strikingly the hypothesis that the jury follows the direction of the evidence." 8 9 The
authors' conclusions are highly relevant because many of the cases
they studied involved scientific evidence.90
More recent literature on the use of lie detector tests, based on
surveys of courtroom use 9 ' and controlled experiments simulating
courtroom testimony, 92 supports the conclusions of The Amerl'canJuy.
Studies have focused on the judicial experience with polygraphy in

95
Wisconsin 96 and Canada.9 7
Massachusetts, 9 3 Michigan, 94 Utah,

concerning the crime involved, the witnesses' testimony and the attorneys' abilities.
Most importantly, the judges were asked to compare how they would have decided
the case with the jury's verdict. Id. The AMERICAN JURY represents the first significant study of the role of the jury in the American criminal justice system. See
Kaplan, Book Review, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 475 (1967).
84. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 83.
85. Id. at 149-62.
86. Id. at 149.
87. Id. at 157.
88. Id. at 149.
89. Id. at 161.
90. Id. at 137.
91. See, e.g., Peters, A Survey ofPolygraphic Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 A.B.A. J.
162 (1981); Tarlow, Admitsstb'iy of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determziing
Credibility in a Perjugy-PlaguedSystem, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1975).
92. See, e.g., Carlson, Pasano & Jannuzzo, The Eect of Lie-Detector Evidence onJury
Deliberations: An Empirital Stuy, 5 J. POL. SCI. & ADM. 148 (1977); Cavoukian &
Heslegrave, The Admissibihty ofPolygraphEvidence in Court, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 117
(1980); Markwart & Lynch, The Eject of Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury Decsion-Mak-

ing, 7 J. POL. Sci. & ADM. 324 (1979).
93. See Tarlow, supra note 91, at 968. See also Barnett, How Does aJuty View
Polygraph Results?, 2 POLYGRAPH 275 (1972).
94. Tarlow, supra note 91, at 968 n.258.
95. Id. (citing State v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1974) (the jury convicted
the defendant although the judge admitted polygraph testimony supporting the defendant's innocence)).
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According to these studies, jurors frequently reject polygraphy evidence and return verdicts inconsistent with the polygraphist's testimony. 98 In the most recent study in Wisconsin, Robert Peters of the
Crime Laboratory Bureau, Wisconsin Department of Justice, states
that "[t]he actual trial results clearly support the belief that juries are
capable of weighing and evaluating all evidence and rendering verdicts that may be inconsistent with the polygraph evidence." 99 In
light of his survey of Wisconsin cases, Mr. Peters flatly asserts that
"polygraph evidence does not assume undue influence in the evidentiary scheme." 100
Laboratory experiments with polygraphy have reached results
consistent with the surveys of courtroom use. In an American study
conducted at Yale, only fourteen and one-half percent of the mock
jurors tested thought that the lie detector evidence was "more significant" than the lay testimony.' 0' In Canadian experiments, sixty-one
percent of the mock jurors labeled the polygraphy evidence as "less
significant" than the lay testimony.' 0 2 During these mock deliberations, the jurors spent little time even discussing the polygraphic
evidence. 103
Other surveys of scientific evidence come to the same conclusion.
For example, in one survey of cases involving sound spectrographyvoiceprint analysis-researchers found that even after hearing
voiceprint evidence, jurors frequently acquit.1 0 4 In one survey, when
spectrography evidence was introduced against the defendant, the
10 5
conviction rate was eleven percent lower than average.
96. See generally Peters, supra note 91.
97. Cavoukian & Heslegrave, supra note 92.
98. See Tarlow, supra note 91, at 968 n.258. See also Peters, supra note 91, at 165.
The author reviewed 11 Wisconsin trials in which polygraph evidence was admitted
by stipulation of the parties. Id. at 164. Of the 19 lawyers involved in these cases
who responded to the author's survey, 17 felt that the polygraph evidence was "reasonable and intelligible" and only four felt that the jury "disregarded significant evidence because of the polygraph testimony." Id. See also Barnett, supra note 93. In
interviews with eight jurors in a criminal trial at which polygraph evidence was used
by the defense, the jury treated the evidence simply as "an additional piece of evidence." Id. at 277.
99. Peters, supra note 91, at 165.
100. Id.
101. Carlson, Pasano & Jannuzzo, supra note 92, at 153.
102. Markwart & Lynch, supra note 92, at 333.
103. Id.
104. Greene, Vot'ceprintl IdentiJ6caiion: The Case in Favor of Admissibih'ty, 13 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 171 (1975). Greene, an assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of
Columbia, analyzed the experiments with sound spectrography and surveyed recent
cases-appellate and trial level-involving the use of voice-identification evidence.
Id. at 173-89.
105. Id. at 190-91. See also Note, supra note 16, at 766.
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Jurors have treated psychiatric testimony in a similar manner,
perhaps reflecting juror skepticism of testimony by mental health experts. 0 6 A later phase of the Chicago Jury Project, dealing with psychiatric testimony, illustrates the point. 10 7 While the major part of
the Project was an analysis of over five hundred jury trials, 0 8 a later
stage of the Project involved experimental juries exposed to psychiatric testimony.' 0 9 In that experiment, the overwhelming majority of
the mock jurors believed that they understood the psychiatric testimony;" o and after interviewing the mock jurors, the researchers concluded that the jurors did, in fact, understand the essence of the
testimony. ''
Of course, it can be argued that polygraphy and psychiatry are
atypical, since both techniques have received extensive adverse publicity." 2 They may be the exception rather than the rule; it is possi106. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967).
107. Id.
108. For a discussion of this phase of the project, see notes 83-90 and accompanying text supra.

109. R. SIMON, supra note 106. The mock juries were shown differing versions of
two trials, one trial for housebreaking and the other for incest, in which the "defendant" pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 34-77. There were six different
versions of the housebreaking trial, with variations in instructions (M'Naghten rule,
Durham "product rule" and an "uninstructed" version) and variations in information concerning the defendant's commitment following trial. Each version was
shown to five different juries. Thus, a total of 30 juries viewed some version of the
housebreaking trial. There were also six different versions of the incest trial, each
version having variations in the jury instructions and variations in the strength of
psychiatric testimony. The incest trial was shown to a total of 98 juries.
110. Id. at 85-86. Seventy-three percent of the jurors felt the psychiatric testimony was helpful; 67% felt that no further psychiatric treatment was necessary to aid
them in their deliberations; and 77% believed that the testimony was not "too technical." Id. at 86.
111. Id. at 217-18.
112. The public controversy over the use of psychiatric evidence was most apparent during the trial of John Hinckley, Jr., in 1982. See, e.g., Kauffman, The Insanity
Plea on Trial, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 8, 1982, at 16 (cover story); A Controversial
Verdict, NEWSWEEK, July 5, 1982, at 30; Is the System Guilty?, TIME, July 5, 1982, at 26
(cover story); Pro and Con.- Bar Psychiatristsas Trial Wtnesses?, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REP., June 7, 1982, at 57; The Insanity Plea on Trial, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 1982, at 56
(cover story). The New York Tmes referred to the Hinckley trial as a "battle of the

psychiatrists." N.Y. Times, May 27, 1982, at B7, col. 1. The controversy over the use
of psychiatric evidence in cases involving the insanity defense rages within the scientific community as well. For two views of this controversy, see Pro and Con.- Bar Psychiatrists as Trial Wtlnesses?, supra. On the use of psychiatry to determine the legal
question of insanity, psychiatrist Willard Gaylin has stated that "[i]t has been degraded to a point of professional embarrassment." Kauffman, supra, at 58 (quoting
GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND: A QUESTION OF JUSTICE (1982)).

The lie detector test has never garnered the same publicity as psychiatric evidence, but there has always been great public awareness of its use. In one notorious
example, Frank Rizzo, a former mayor of Philadelphia, agreed to submit to a liedetector test to prove his innocence of charges of political harassment and corrupt
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ble that jurors generally overestimate the value of scientific evidence
but are particularly skeptical of polygraphy and psychiatry because
of prior publicity. However, even that explanation is breaking down.
In 1980, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, one of America's leading witness psychologists, reported the results of an experiment conducted to determine the relative weight that jurors attach to lay and scientific
testimony. 113 The hypothetical fact situation for the experiment was
a bad check case.1 4 In one variation of the hypothetical, the defendant was identified by lay testimony. In another variation, the identification was based on high-caliber scientific evidence such as
fingerprints. The mock jurors were more willing to convict on the
basis of lay identification testimony than on the basis of fingerprints. 115 Jurors not only trust their own perception and memory;
they tend to trust the perception and memory of other lay persons as
well."16 In addition, scientific testimony is new to them, and the nat117
ural distrust of the unfamiliar comes into play.
It would be foolish and premature to conclude on the basis of
this meager data that most lay jurors are definitely capable of critically evaluating scientific evidence. Research into the extent of their
capability is still in its early stages. In the final analysis, we may identify certain types of scientific evidence that jurors have special difficulty analyzing.
At the very least, however, the clear weight of the available hard
data calls into question the assumption underlying Fiye, namely, that
scientific testimony overwhelms the typical lay juror. The scientific
community has a right to accuse the legal community of being biased
and unscientific in its treatment of scientific testimony. As Professors
Kalven and Zeisel stressed, the question of the jury's competence cannot be answered apriori."8 The question must be investigated empirically, and the truth of the matter is that the empirical studies
practices in selecting architectural firms for city work. The Mayor, who had stated,
"I believe in the polygraph," reportedly "flunked six key questions." Rizzo's Waterloo?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1973, at 90.
113. Loftus, Psychological Aspects of Courtroom Testimony, in 347 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. Sci. 27 (1980).

114. Id. at 32.
115. Id. at 33.
116. Id. See also Loftus & Monahan, Trial by Data: Psychological Research as Legal
Evidence, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Mar. 1980, at 276; Taylor, Reliability ofEyewitness Identification, CRIM. DEF., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 7.
117. Austin, Jugy Perceptions on Advocacy: A Case Study, LITIGATION, Summer
1982, at 16 (in an antitrust case involving a great deal of expert testimony about
economics and electronics, the jurors were "skeptical of the experts").
118. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 83, at 151.
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conducted to date simply do not support the assumptions made by
most courts.
This topic has far-reaching significance; it implicates fundamental libertarian and democratic values. In a criminal case, when a defendant's liberty is at stake, how tolerant can we be of evidence prone
to error? In a democratic society, to what extent shall we place our
faith in lay jurors who have no expertise in the technical field to
which the testimony in the case relates? If we assume that scientific
evidence is unduly error-prone and that lay jurors cannot adequately
analyze it, we shall face some cruel choices. On those assumptions, in
effect, liberty is pitted against democracy. We can give defendants'
liberty the maximum protection by limiting the role of the jury, or we
can opt to preserve the jury's role at the risk of erroneous fact-finding
and wrongful conviction. We need not face that choice at all, however, if the preliminary indications of jurors' competence prove to be
correct. While we certainly need additional research to test the preliminary indications, at least at this point we have good reason to be
hopeful. The poet Thomas Campbell once wrote that the message of
science is despair.1 19 Campbell feared that the empiricism of science
would eventually erode our belief in intangible values. But Campbell
may have been wrong. It may be science that gives us new hope and
120
renewed faith in the democratic jury.
119. Pleasuresof Hope, Part II, lines 325-26.
Oh! Star-eyed Science, hast thou wandered there
To waft us home the message of despair?

Id.
120. See, e.g. , Younger, A PracticalApproach to the Use of Expert Testimony, 31 CLEV.

ST. L.

REv.

1, 39, 40 (1982) ("In my experience, the jury does a very good job of

assessing the credibility of an expert ....
[J]urors are eminently capable of weighing ...
one expert's qualifications against another's.").
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